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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of 
professional interest to officers of the naval �ervice. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy 
Department or of the Na val War College. 
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HOW TO PREPARE A .RESEARCH PAPER · 
A lecture delivered by 
Dean James Harold Fox 
at the Naval War College 
23 August 1950 
I understand that you frequently have to engage in research 
-usually the research that necessarily precedes administrative ac­
tion; but sometimes research of a more formal nature. I assume
that the results of your efforts are normally reported in writing,
but on occasion I am told that they must be made orally. It is my
purpose this morning to give you what help I can with such matters.
No doubt your immediate reaction is, "What does he know 
about naval research and our work here at the War College?" The 
answer is, "Very little." Although a good deal of time has been 
taken to show me representative examples of reports and to dis­
cuss with me some of the criteria used in judging research papers, 
I must confess only a. very superficial acquaintance with your 
problems. 
Whatever I have to off er must come largely from thirteen 
years of experience in directing the research of graduate students, 
during which time I have tried to assist several hundred students 
with minor research problems and have tried to give guidance to 
about one hundred students who were working on theses and dis­
sertations. Because of this, part of what I am going to say to you 
may not apply directly to your situations. I must depend upon you 
to select that which you find pertinent. 
Mr. Fox is Dean of the School of Education, George Washington University. 
RESTRICTED 1 
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STEPS IN RESEARCH 
Research is a complex activity involving a wide variety · of 
steps and procedures. In my course at the University we devote a 
semester to the study of research methods. The content includes 
discussion of historical, experimental, case study, and genetic re­
search methods, as well as several types of normative methods. The 
11se of bibliographical and statistical tools are also studied. Obviously, 
the content of a semester course cannot be presented in 20 minutes. 
In view of this, I shall simply list for you a few of the 
more obvious steps in conducting relatively uncomplicated histori­
cal and normative research. 
Clarify the problem. Examine the statement of the prob­
lem. See that you interpret the meaning of each word in the same 
way as the person or group making the assignment. Be sure that 
you understand the scope and limitations of the problem. For 
instance, if the word "future" appears in the description of it, find 
out whether it means the next three months, one year, five years, 
or twenty-five years. 
Consider-the setting of the problem. A problem never occurs 
in a vacuum. It grows out of something; it is related to a host of 
other problems; and it leads to something. You should take time 
to study these relationships by (1) informally interviewing those 
acquainted with related background and contemporary problems, (2) 
forming small discussion groups and taking turns exploring the 
settings of each other's problems, or (3) gathering background in­
formation in the library, from newspapers, and unpublished reports. 
Analyze the problem into its sub-problems or phases. _Before 
attacking a problem reduce it to its simplest elements so that each 
may be attacked singly. Your ability to do this will depend in part 
2 RESTRICTED 
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upon your success with the previous step. Again, small group dis­
cussion is likely to be an effective tool. 
Construct a tentative plan for your report. The essential 
parts of a report will be outlined later in this address but it should 
be stated here that the report should be planned around the probable 
questions of the readers. 
Of course, these will vary. If your report is to be read only 
by the staff and students of the War College, the plan of it will 
differ from one to be read by the Bureau of Naval Personnel or a 
civilian board. 
Again, a small group of students, working together, can do 
much to increase the sensitivity of one another to reader interests. 
Role playing is a useful device in this connection. Let each mem­
ber of the group play the role of a different type of reader. 
Explore the sources of data. In this connection, careful 
consideration should be given to the reliability of data. Ordinarily, 
primary sources are more reliable than secondary or tertiary 
sources. A primary source may be simply defined as one that has 
not been subjected to the biased or incomplete interpretation of an 
intermediate person. The original writings of Admiral Mahan 
would constitute primary evidence concerning his views. A jour­
nalist's or historian's interpretation of his writings would be a 
secondary source. A review of the historian's interpretation would 
be a tertiary source, since the original evidence was subjected to 
the distortion of two successive interpreters. 
The most of your sources are likely to be secondary or ter­
tiary. You will need, therefore, to be concerned with the faithful­
ness with which the primary evidence is reported. In this connection, 
you will want to consider the scholarship of the writer, his skill in 
RESTRICTED 3 
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reporting, and the nature and extent of his bias. An eye-witness ac­
count by a good news reporter, operating under a liberal editorial 
policy, may be a very reliable source of data. On the other hand, a 
news analyst's summary, subject to both selective and directive bias 
on two levels, is usually not considered to be a very reliable< source 
of information. 
Construct an exact list of sources of data. This normally be­
gins with the construction of a bibliography. Locate, with the · 
help of the librarian, appropriate indexes to the desired ref er­
ences. Construct a tentative list of headings with which to gain 
entry to the indexes. Try out the headings on one volume of an 
index. Discard unfruitful headings and revise the list as indicated 
by the trial run. 
Use a bibliographical card to list each reference. A printed 
card, such as the one by Alexander, is desirable if complete biblio­
graphical data is desired. If less information is needed, the student 
may wish to construct and have duplicated, a simpler card. 
Other sources of data such as unpublished reports, statis..: 
tical compilations, and lectures should be similarly listed on cards. 
Revise the tentative plan of the report. By this time, the 
student will have a much better understanding of the nature and 
scope of the data. It is time to revise the plan of the report in the 
light of this new knowledge. 
Prepare a catalogue based upon the tentative plan of the 
report. The bibliographical cards should be used for this purpose 
and adequate cross references should be made. 
If the research is normative and the data lends itself to 
tabulations, some kind of worksheet will be needed. For data 
easily coded a large sheet ruled both ways may be satisfactory. 
4 RESTRICTED 
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For descriptive data, not easily coded, a card system is likely 
to be better. 
Finally, revise the plan of the report. With the data well in 
hand, needed, revisions in the plan of the report will become 
apparent. 
HOW TO WRITE A RESEARC,H REPORT 
A research report is a means of communicating research 
findings to a particular audience. It always involves commun­
ication difficulties, the magnitude of which depends upon the 
facility of the author in writing and the nature of the audience. 
For instance, when a naval officer is writing for an audience of 
naval officers, semantic difficulties are likely to be a minimum, 
since the audience is thoroughly familiar with the terminology of 
the writer. If, however, the audience is civilian, semantic diffi­
culties may be much greater. Perhaps it is not too improbable 
to suggest that, in the future, naval officers are likely to have 
cause to write for civilian audiences more frequently. 
Make the report easy to read. This is not the time to impose 
an intelligence test upon the reader; nor is it the place to prove 
that you have a sixty-four dollar vocabulary. The mechanical 
difficulties of reading should be reduced to a minimum so that the 
reader can devote his entire attention to what is being commun­
icated to him. 
Use a vocabulary that is understood by the audience. Each 
reader has a different vocabulary at his disposal, since his vocab­
ulary reflects his previous exp�riences .. The effective vocabulary 
available to a writer is that which is held in common by each mem­
ber of the audience. Since the writer cannot precisely survey the 
vocabulary mastery of each member of his audience, his only 
RESTRICTED , · 5 
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recourse is to use a vocabulary burden considerably less than that 
which could b.e tolerated by any one individual in his audience. 
Make the composition easy to read. The more syllables 
there are in a word, the harder it is to read and understand. Like� 
wise, the more words that there are in a sentence, the more diffi­
. cult it is. Short paragraphs are more readable than long ones. 
Placing the topic sentence first in the paragraph makes the material 
easier to scan. 
Side-headings also increase readability, as do double spacing 
and short lines. Skillful use of tables, diagrams, and J?ictures 
can do much to improve written communication. 
Maintaining a high level of reader interest. Simplification 
of the mechanics of reading tends to increase interest since it 
permits more concentration upon content. Good planning and a 
logical presentation also encourages interest. Reader interest is 
heightened by using more words about people .and addressing 
more sentences to the audience. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
Title. The title should embody in concise form the subject of 
the report. If this requires a lengthy statement it may be advisable 
to use a short title and a longer sub-title. 
Preface. If you must philosophize before coming to grips 
with the subject,. do so here. The reader will then be able to skip 
it. However, the preface may serve the valuable purpose of acquaint­
ing the reader with the writer's p�rsonal interest in the problem. 
Table of contents. The main purpose of the table of con­
tents is to acquaint the reader with the scope of the report and its 
6 RESTRICTED 
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major divisions. Although it helps the reader to locate the major 
divisions, it is not an index. 
Introduction. Begin the introduction with a clear, concise 
statement of the problem. Do not try an ornamental, subtle, or 
philosophical approach. The reader needs to be anchored to the 
problem. Do so in a straightforward manner. 
Follow the statement of the problem with definitions of 
terms, if needed, and a clear statement of its scope and limitations. 
Do not discuss the meanings of ternis. Decide upon the meaning 
desired and state it. 
Break the problem down into its sub-problems, keeping in 
mind the probable questions of the reader; If needed for clarity, 
illustrate each sub-problem with an example. 
Having stated the problem, tell the reader in general terms 
what steps were taken to solve it. This need not be in sufficient 
detail to enable the reader to repeat the research but it should be 
enough to satisfy him that the research was sufficiently complete 
and skillful to warrant the investment of enough time to read it. 
What is included will depend upon the nature of the problem, but 
ordinarily the categories of data sources should be listed and the 
means of discovering, selecting, and utilizing them should be 
described. 
It will be observed that the introduction answers two ques­
tions: "What is the problem?" and "How was it solved?". 
Review of the literature. In the case of historical research, 
this will be the main body of the report. If it is a normative re­
search, the chapter on the literature serves to bring the reader up to 
the frontier of knowledge, prior to the present research. The review 
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normally ends with a concise description· of the status of the sit­
uation and the bearing of the research upon it. In some cases, a 
separate chapter should be devoted to the status of the situation. 
A simple chronological recital of historical developments is 
seldom more desirable. Usually, it is better to trace the development 
of each sub-problem separately, organizing the references around 
major changes, trends, or centers of interest. Ordinarily, it is 
not necessary to describe all the references of the period. When­
ever possible, the writer should group similar references together, 
describe the most typical, and merely note important variations in 
the others. It is well, however, to mention these references in the 
footnotes, lest the reader disagree with the way that they have 
been categorized and may wish to check for himself. 
Detailed description of the research procedures. Normative 
research, requiring the use of a variety of devices to gather data 
from diverse sources, should have its procedures described in some 
detail in the report. Unnecessary detail should be avoided but· 
there should be sufficient detail to permit the reader to repeat 
this research if he questions the data or conclusions. Failure to 
do so may impair confidence in the research findings. 
As a rule, this chapter may be omitted in a report of his­
torical research, the description of procedures in the introduction 
being sufficient. 
Presentation of the findings. It is well to begin the chapter 
on the findings of the research by orienting the reader concerning 
the plan of attack. Treatment .of each sub-problem or phase of 
the study normally follows in the sequence planned earlier. 
Before presenting the data concerning a phase of the pro­
blem the reader may need to be oriented with respect to its general 
significance and its relationship to the problem. The writer should 
8 RESTRICTED 
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be guided in this by the anticipated questions of the reader. These 
should have been considered early in the research. 
Presentation of the data in the form most easily understood 
by the reader should follow immediately. Tables and figures are 
to be used only when they facilitate interpretation of the data. 
Ordinarily, data should be presented only once, although repetition 
for purposes of analysis is sometimes desirable. 
To discuss data before it has been presented is an affront 
to the reader. It is false economy to misplace tabulations of data 
in order to save paper. A complete restatement of data following 
tabular presentation is superfluous, although the writer may pro­
perly call the reader's attention to particular points that may be 
missed, especially if they are to form bases for inferences and 
conclusions to be drawn later. 
Implications and conclusions. The final chapter or section 
of the report generally deals with implications and conclusions 
drawn from study of the data. This is the most difficult part of 
research. Inadequate utilization of the data collected is a comm�m 
failing of researchers. Group study of data generally results in 
better utilization. 
As a rule, conclusions should be based only upon the data 
presented. If other bases are used, they should be identified and 
their relative influence indicated. 
Adaptation to short research assignments. Obviously, the 
type of report described above is too extensive for use in reporting 
· quick research that precedes administrative action. It may be un­
necessary to report such research at all; or presentation of only
the conclusions with the more crucial supporting data may be suf­
ficient. It should be remembered that a report is only a means
to an end and its form should be that which best serves that end.
RESTRICTED 9 
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ORAL PRESENTATION OF A REPORT 
In most respects the presentation of an oral report is very 
similar to that of a written report. However, there are some 
major points of difference. These stem largely from the fact that 
the ear replaces the eye as the receptive sense organ, and the in­
strument of communication is the voice instead of writing. 
The ear is less sensitive than the eye and has a longer 
reaction time. In most people, it is less effective in stimulating 
mental imagery, although there are some exceptions to this gen­
eralization. Although both sense organs respond to only limited 
wave lengths, the range of variability is normally greater for the 
eye than the ear. 
On the other hand, the voice, since it -operates under fewer 
restricting rules, is much more adaptable to communication needs 
than writing as practiced at present. Stultifying rules of grammar 
and spelling need to be modified to permit greater flexibility in 
writing. The use of different colors and types of print would also 
introduce a desirable flexibility. 
The idea, then, is to avoid or circumvent, as far as possible, 
the limitations of the voice-ear medium and exploit to the fullest 
its advantages. 
Speak Slowly. Much of the effectiveness of the late Pres-. 
ident Roosevelt's speech was due to a slow delivery with effective 
phrasing and significant pauses. 
Enuncirtte clearly. Good enunciation is to the ear as a 
clear-cut image is to the eye. Blurred speech is like blurred print. 
Poor enunciation is usually a matter of habit and it takes 
repeated effort to improve it. There are, among others, three 
10 RESTRICTED 
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common causes: the habit of speaking too rapidly - trying to 
speak as rapidly as one can read; a lazy tongue - failure to adjust 
the mouth cavity to get needed resonance; and poor use of the lips 
- incomplete termination of sounds, resulting in blurring.
Pronounce acceptably. This is of no great importance com­
munication-wise. Rarely is a word so poorly mispronounced as to 
be misunderstood (unless a strong accent is involved). However, 
acceptable pronunciation is important socially. Because -of this, 
pronunciation ordinarily should conform to usage commonly accept­
ed by the audience. 
Use intensity effectively. If you cannot be heard in the 
back row, you are only speaking to a part of your audience. Open­
ing the mouth sufficiently to get the full effect of resonance is 
important. Brea.the deeply to get more pressure across the vocal 
chords, thus increasing the amplitude of their vibrations. Strength­
en the vocal chords through exercise. 
Vary tone and loudness. The ear is more easily bored than 
the eye. If interest is to be maintained, variations in pitch and 
intensity are essential. The monotone who maintains a constant 
level of intensity. is· apt to lull his audience to sleep. 
Be as natural as the situation permits. As a rule, the natural 
speaking style of the speaker is more effective than any affectation 
of style. It should be remembered, however, that naturalness is 
only a means to an end, and the speaker should not hesitate to use 
any socially-acceptable device that will improve communication. 
An oral report fa likely to be more effective if the speaker 
uses only a few notes as a guide. This permits greater flexibility 
and increases sensitivity to audience reactions. 
There will be times, however, when the nature of the content 
or the demands of the occasion require close adherence to written 
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copy. The handicaps thus imposed may be offset in part by slow 
delivery, careful phrasing, good inflection, and off-the-cuff elab­
orations of important points. 
Use illustrations. The tendency of the ear to handicap men­
tal imagery may be overcome in part by the liberal use of illus­
trations. However, care should be taken to see that the center of 
interest does not shift from the report to the illustration. This 
requires presentation of the illustration in terms of only the dram­
atic outline necessary to strengthen the impact of the point under 
consideration. 
Use appropriate visualization. Some of the limitations of 
oral presentation may be overcome by the use of visual aids, facial 
e�pression, and gestures. Again, these should not be permitted 
to usurp the center of interest. 
Keep within the bounds of time available. To permit slow 
delivery and the ample use of illustrations, content needs to be 
condensed. This requires skillful briefing of the material without 
omitting essential points. 
Many other aspects of oral presentation. It is obvious that 
only a few aspects of oral presentation have been mentioned. De­
tailed development of the subject must be left to other means; 
but it is hoped that these few points will be of some assistance to 
those who make oral reports. 
12 RESTRICTED 
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THE RISE OF SOVIET POWER 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. P. E. Mosely 
at the Naval War College 
28 August, 1950 
Captain Felt, members of the Naval War College and guests: 
I should point out at the very beginning of this phase of 
your work on the Russian problem that there are no "Russian 
experts". There are only varying degrees of ignorance about Rus­
sia, and I'm sure you will discover that I have varying degrees of 
ignorance about Russia, especially after we get into our discussion. 
What I want to do today is to point out some of the things 
which we ought to watch in Russian development in order to es­
timate both the capacities and the intentions of the Soviet leader­
ship, and what they can get from their people and their regime 
in the way of power. 
This brings us first to the question of the nature of the 
historic development of the last 30 or 40 years in Russia, and 
here I want to point out that Russia has not had just one revolution. 
It has had at least four revolutions, and they are not yet ended. 
That is why this is an open-ended problem and one that is so 
baffling to try to get at, quite aside from the obstacles which the. 
Soviet government places in the way of the objective study of 
any problem by its own people and the objective study of Russia 
by people outside. 
Doctor Mosely is Professor of International Relations at the Russian 
Institute, Columbia University. 
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I want to take a quick look at Russia as it was at the begin­
ning of this ce�tury and discuss so�e �f the main processes that 
have been going on in Russian society, and then see how some of 
those problems shape up today; 
Pre-World-War-I Russia was already th_e most populous 
state in Europe, and I think that we should bear that in mind 
when we consider Russia's population today. If it had not been for 
the losses suffered by Russia during the First World War, during 
the Civil War and intervention, which were much more destruc­
tive than the World War, then the period of famine, then the col­
lectivization, (it must have eliminated around 5,000,000 people), 
then .the Second World War which probably had direct losses of 
12,000,000 people, and finally losses due to decline in birthrate 
during the war, (perhaps 5,000,000 more), if it were not for those 
great blood-lettings, which have occured at least three tjmes in a 
little over thirty years, we would face a Soviet Union which would 
have around 275,000,000 people rather than one which probably 
has around 210,000,000 today. I just want to mention in passing 
that even the size of Russia's population is a State secret, and 
estimates made abroad vary all ways from 195,000,000 as of today, 
up to 220,000,000. So there is a gap of 25,000,000 people which 
have not been fully accounted for. That is the kind of problem 
that you are going to face and all of us who work on Russia face 
in trying to find out the elementary facts about the country. 
Russia in 1941 had great resources which were only be­
ginning to be developed, and l want to mention, also in passing, 
(you'll hear much more about that later from my friend Doctor 
Shimkin) that, on the whole, they are badly located. Many of 
their mineral resources are relatively inaccessible and it requires 
a provision of the most elementary techniques of civilization in 
order to get at many of those resources. 
14 RESTRICTED 
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Then the agricultural resources are poorly distributed. Al­
though Russia is still a half-agrarian country and in 1914 was 
more than 80% agricultural according to the occupations of its 
people, Russia actually has a usable and useful agricultural area 
sliglrtly smaller than that of the United States, although Russia 
has a total area larger than that of the United States and Canada 
combined. Even these agricultural resources are not well located 
in terms of climate. The richest areas are in the west. They nar­
row in width as one moves eastward, but as the winds from the 
central part of Asia come from the Volga, crossing the Volga, 
they bring periodic famines. 1947, for example, was a very bad 
year in Russian agriculture, but famine seems to have been averted 
by government steps. 
Then all this area east of the Urals looks very green on 
the map. Actually the area from the Urals eastward and to the 
south is too dry, northward too wet and cold to be useful. 
In 1914, Russia was engaged in an agrarian revolution .. 
In fact, there were two revolutions going on simultaneously. One 
of these was the struggle of the peasants for control of the land, 
a pattern which is very old in Europe, and other countries too. 
As political awareness grows, social demands grow. The peasants 
have striven to take the land for themselves and to throw off the 
control of the landowners, and this struggle has gone on inter­
mittently in Russia for many decades, often leading to consid­
erable violence. In the 1950 revolution for example, there were 
very widespread agrarian outbursts of violence. The gradual trans­
fer of the land from the landowners to the peasants had been going 
on rapidly in the decades before the revolution, and even if there 
had not been a violent political revolution most of the land of 
Russia would have been in the hands of the peasants by 1925. 
They would have had it in their hands much the same as the French 
peasa:n� has it, mainly in small holdings. 
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Now this agrarian revolution had been fostered by the 
government after 1905. It wanted to build up a class of land-own­
ing peasantry, feeling that that would cure the peasantry of rev­
olutionary dealings and lead them to support the government. At 
the same time there was this continuing resentment of the peas­
antry for the past abuses of the land-owning system and a desire 
for revenge. I think if we look at the agrarian revolution which 
occured in 1917 quite spontaneously as soon as the Czarist gov­
ernment was removed, we must recognize that it was more an 
emotional than a rational outburst. It was a response to the 
abuses of the peasantry under serfdom. Serfdom had only been 
abolished officially after 1861, and there were many people alive 
who had lived under it. It takes many generations to overcome 
the effects of serfdom with its interference with the lives of the 
peasantry, its control over them, the helplessness of the peasant 
in the face of the land-owner, backed by the authority of the state. 
We must remember that under serfdom a landlord could order 
any of his peasants exiled to Siberia, - a very severe punishment. 
He could interfere with his marriage, could sell the peasant indi­
vidually or his family. In fact, except for the question of color, 
(because there was no difference of color), Russian serfdom was 
in many ways more severe than slavery in this country prior to 
our war between the states. And all that left an accumulation 
of class hatred. I think we cannot understand what happened 
in 1917 except in terms of emotional desire for revenge. On a 
rational pattern of thinking, the peasants should have just gone 
along taking over the land, becoming independent landholders. 
One other factor in the agrarian situation was very im­
portant in 1917, and has continued to be of importance, and that 
is the system of joint holding practiced by the Great Russians. 
This system of communal ownership or joint ownership was not 
practiced in the Ukraine, and it was not practiced in Belo-Russia 
16 RESTRICTED 
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(White Russia) or in the Baltic states, or in the Caucasus or 
Central Asia. It was a typical land-holding system of the Great 
Russians, the people inhabiting the Republic of Great Russia 
of today within the Soviet Union. 
Now under this system, the peasants did not own the land 
individually but merely had the right to use it as joint owners 
along with the other members of the village. Under a system of 
periodic partition, the land was redistributed from time to time 
and the peasant could therefore never be sure of holding indef­
initely the land which he then cultivated or, even less, of passing 
it on to his children. 
This system of the Mir, or communal land-holding, was 
in my opinion the root of the population problem prior to 1914. 
Under the communal system, the peasant who limited the number 
of his children would get less land. So, in a sense, there was a 
competition among the peasants to see who could have the most 
children because that established the number of working hands 
in the family, or the number of mouths to be fed. That was the 
basis of division of the land, in the periodic redistribution. 
Under the communal system of land-holding, the peasant 
worked his own land and enjoyed the product of it. It was not 
at all like the collective farm system of today, but it did mean 
that the individual Russian peasant had very little conception 
of private property. He was interested in getting all the land for 
all the peasants rather than getting more land for himself. 
The peasants were not too enthusiastic about the govern° 
ment's plan for distributing the land to individual peasants. In 
1917, when the government's pressure was removed, the peasants 
simply turned around, drove out the landlords, reestablished the 
system of commun�I ownership where it had been broken down 
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in part, and carried out a communal revolution of their own. 
This revolution committed the peasant against· private ownership 
of land. That -meant that he was not able to struggle against 
the Soviet regime once it was established in power, because he 
did not have the clear idea of individual ownership as it had devel­
oped throughout most of the rest of Europe. And the problem of 
the relation of the peasant to the land was further complicated 
by the pressure of population against the supply of land. 
The population pressure which developed in Russia after 
1860 was expressed in the doubling of the population every 25 
years. In the United States we were doubling our population too, 
but we were doing it in large part through immigration of adults, 
able and ready to work, and in many cases already highly trained. 
Many of our best engineers came from Denmark, Norway, Ger­
many, France, and so forth. In the Russian system, however, 
most of this increased population remained on the land with the 
result that the size of the individual holdings declined. The pres­
sure merely to raise enough food to feed the peasant's own family 
grew more intense. The land was impoverished because the bal­
ance between livestock and cereal crops was broken down in many 
parts of the country. The growth of industry, while rapid, was 
too slow to absorb the surplus. So it backed up in the villages 
and left a reservoir of social resentment which complicated the 
solution of all the other problems. 
In 1914 Russia had plenty of population, plenty of resour­
ces, although not well distributed, but it lacked capital, and it 
lacked industrial. techniques. In spite of these handicaps, industry 
was developing rapidly. The rate of growth of Russian industry 
prior to 1914 was greater than at the corresponding period of 
American industrialization and in many ways was greater than 
that achieved by the Soviet regime in its industrialization. But 
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the industrialization wa� at the first stage when the new con­
<,litions of work weigh upon the peasants up-rooted from the vil­
lages. It was a plilriod like the early industrial revolution in 
England, with its severe discipline, its repression of trade unions, 
and its accumulation of capital by the owners in order to finance 
this rapid expansion. It was not at all like the more "benevolent" 
and more mature type of capitalism with which we are familiar 
in our own generation and the last two generations in this country; 
Russia then had a rapidly growing industry, but it had 
certain great handicaps. First of all, it had to be forced by the 
government. In Russia, the government accounted for more than 
half of the growth of industry, either directly or indirectly. Some 
great factories were built directly by the government and operated 
by it. Many more were built with government subsidies, or guar­
antee of loans on money borrowed abroad. In other cases con­
tracts were given over a period of years in order to stimulate the 
growth of industry. In addition the government, of course, op­
erated most of the railroad system and all of this great develop­
ment had to be paid for out of the peasant standard of living in 
spite of the large-scale borrowings from abroad, especially from 
France. This meant that industry had not settled down, and the 
workers had not achieved a stable position in society. There was 
widespread discontent among the workers, and it was through 
that discontent that the initial nucleus of the Communist regime 
was created. In the revolution of 1917 this nucleus emerged vic­
torious because it was able to control the cities and to win either 
the support or the neutrality of the peasants and in that way to 
establish control iri the country. 
One other factor, which proved to be important in the 
political strategy of Bolshevism, was the high degree of concen­
tration of industry .. This concentration was natural, because cap-
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ital was scarce, because techniques had to be imported, and because 
the development was in such a large part, especially .in heavy in­
dustry, under the guidance of the government. The tendency was 
to develop large enterprises. Actually, in 1913 Russia had more 
· factories employing 1,000 men or more than the United States
although the total American industrialization was at least six
times more than the total Russian- industrialization at that time.
Aside from the agrarian revolution and the industrial re­
volution, there was a third revolution which was taking place­
the political revolution. Briefly, there were main forces.; there 
was the force that supported the autocracy, which believed in 
strong and paternalistic rule from above and no discussion below, 
and this concept remained strong. It dominated the bureaucracy 
which ran the country until 1917, and led it into sharp conflict 
with the other two political forces. 
There was a second political force represented by liberalism, 
by the ambition to develop along the lines of western democracy. 
This element was influential, but it was not strong numerically. 
It had not been able to integrate most of the peasants and workers 
into support of .its program. It rested on a very thin layer of the 
population which was well informed about the western countries. 
Many educated -Russians travelled abroad. In many ways educated 
people found it difficult to communicate with the ordinary worker 
and peasant. In a sense, they were in the same predicament as 
many Chinese intellectuals who had studied abroad for a great 
many years and .who were unable to lead their own people on re­
turning to China. In Russia there was something of the same 
problem of social and cultural distance between th.e intelligentsia, 
the educated group, with its western sympathies, and the ordinary 
people. This separation was marked also by a difference in dress, 
in manner, in way of life. The ordinary Russian is not a very 
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clean person; the intelligentsia prided itself on cleanliness. The 
intelligentsia wore western clothes, the peasants and many of the 
workers still wore traditional peasant dress. There was a differ­
ence in manner, in speech, in the way they thought, even in vocab­
ulary. And the liberals were not able really to consolidate the 
headstart which they had in the beginning of the revolution in 
1917. 
The third element was the revolutionary force, those who 
rejected gradualism, who were just as much opposed to parlia­
mentary and western democracy as were the supporters of the 
old regime, who wanted, in some form or another, some kind of 
dictatorship which would lead the country, not doing what the 
people wanted, but what the leaders "knew" was good for them. 
, These revolutionary groups were not large. They were of course, 
the extreme wing of the intelligentsia and often received sympathy 
and support because they were leading a bitter fight against the 
old regime. Many of them led an heroic underground life, carrying 
on a guerrilla warfare against the police authorities of the state. 
Many of them suffered execution, exile to Siberia, loss of health 
and even life. They were professional revolutionaries, a type 
with which we are quite unfamiliar in this country. It was a special 
profession, living under false papers, bound by very tight bonds 
of solidarity within a small group, dreaming about the future and 
believing they had the recipe for changing every aspect of Russian 
life. 
Among the groups of revolutionaries, there was a small 
group, an extreme wing of what was then called the "Social Dem­
ocratic Party", which became the Communist Party in 1918. This 
party emerged in control- during the chaotic period following the 
breakdown of the old regime. In a sense Russia in 1917 was caught 
in mid-stream. There were promising developments toward dem-
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ocracy of the type that we know. There had been a system of county 
self-government established gradually from the 1860's on, which 
had played a very great part in improving health, education and 
social services in the country. After 1906, there was a parliamen­
tary body, the State Duma, which, however, was elected under 
rather a restricted suffrage and which was unable to dominate 
the government. It was engaged in a struggle from 1906 to 1917 
to secure control over the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was al­
ways engaged in fighting off these attempts, and neither side 
was strong enough to win. The czarist regime, having become rel­
atively mild and almost liberal in its last years, did not wish to 
suppress these institutions of representative assembly of the Duma 
or the Zemstvo. On the other hand, they were not willing or not 
weak enough to surrender the power which they had, especially 
the power over the police and the armed forces. 
If Russia had· not been defeated in the war of 1914-1917, 
perhaps there would have been a gradual evolution. Perhaps the 
power of the Duma would have been strengthened. There might 
have been a gradual shift of control, and with the completion of 
the agrarian reform from above, mentioned earlier, a catastrophic 
revolution might have been avoided. 
All of these contradictions were tied · up together with the 
impact of the war. While the Russian army fought very bravely 
and suffered very severely from 1914 to 1917, it did not have a po, 
Utical understanding - of the war. There was discipline, yes, but 
when that broke down there was not a common political ambition 
or platform to which you could appeal to secure voluntary obedience 
when the compelled obedience had disappeared in the revolution. 
In a s'ense, the Czarist regime fell or disintegrated rather 
than being overthrown. Then there was a struggle between the 
liberal and democratic forces and the revolutionary ones. The 
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liberal elements were unable to end the war without breaking with 
the allies. They wanted to cooperate closely with France, England 
and the United States. Therefore they refused to consider with­
drawing from the war in order to make a separate peace. On the 
other hand, they were not able to create a new army and find a new 
basis for political loyalty among the masses of soldiers and sailors 
who made up the armed forces. So they were caught. The shift, 
the revolution, came when the country was in mid-stream. They 
were beginning to develop habits of political discussion, party life, 
relatively free elections, and yet the new regime, the Communist 
regime, was the one which reverted to paternalism, to rule from 
above, in an autocratic manner. 
As the leader of the revolution, Lenin, said in 1917, just 
before seizure of power, when he was asked by many of the 
doubting members of his own party, "Well, how can we keep power, 
we are only a little group, how can we rule Russia?" Lenin said, 
"Well, if the Czar could rule Russia with the help of a hundred 
thousand land owners serving as voluntary police chiefs, and rule 
it against the aspirations of the bulk of the people, certainly we can 
rule it with three hundred thousand members of the Communist 
party and rule it in accordance with the desires of the people." So, 
in a sense what happened in 1917 was that the slow progress to-. 
wards the democracy of the west was scrapped, not without a con­
siderable fight, it is true. A new revolutionary paternalism took 
the place of the old autocratic paternalism and established a new 
authority which could hand down orders from above. The bulk of 
the people could find some comfort in obeying them whether they 
could fully understand them or not. 
Now, in addition to these three principal revolutions, agrar­
ian, industrial, political, there were three minor revolutions going 
on which I can group together under the heading of the cultural 
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revolution. In the cultural field, there was a great outreaching, 
certainly by the ordinary Russian people, for greater educational 
and other opportunities. In 1913 Russia was still more than 60% 
illiterate, but a large part of that was found among the' older gen­
eration or among the village women, who were not accustomed to 
learning to read and write and did not see any need for it. The per­
centage of literacy in the younger generation was already much 
higher, and by the process of change from one generation to another, 
and in accordance with the plans for education which were under 
way at that time, Russia would have been a completely literate 
country probably around 1925 to 1930. In fact, literacy· would 
have been achieved by these programs earlier than it was by the 
revolution, in spite of the Soviet claim that elimination of iUiteracy 
has been one of the chief merits of the new regime. 
Now, learning to read and write is not too much in itself. 
It is a question of what they are going to learn to read and write, 
and in what language. Was the cultural content to be a repetition 
of what had gone on in the old regime? Or was it to be reaching out 
for reforms, for political democracy, or social democracy? Here 
was part of the cultural problem: if you taught all the young peas­
ants to read and write, they would probably get to reading revo­
lutionary literature in a very short time, and their political loy­
alties would shift to either: the liberals or the revolutionaries. So 
here was a first-class problem. What would you give them to read? 
The second problem was-in what language? Russia, in 1914 
as today, was inhabited up to 50% by Great Russians or by the Rus­
sians in the proper sense, among other numerous peoples. For in­
stance, the Ukrainians number somewhere between 30 and 40 
millions. And other peoples, such as the Poles, the Byelorussians, 
the Baltic peoples, the peoples of the Caucasus,-Armenians, Geor­
gians, Azerbaijanian Turks,-and the peoples of Central Asia. The 
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Russian nationality was dominant. Until 1914 it far out-shadowed 
the other Orthodox Slav elements, - the Byelorussians and Ukrain­
ians, - while the Poles remained unassimilated by the Russians. 
On the other hand, the Mohammed peoples, - and we must remem­
ber that Russia,_ is one of the largest Mohammedan countries, -
were left pretty much to themselves, provided they obeyed the 
orders of the local officials. 
If this cultural revolution took place in the Russian language 
and through its· use would there be recognition in the other lan­
guages? Would there be recognition of the non-Russian languages 
and cultures, with the very real possibility that these peoples would 
then develop a real consciousness of their own languages, then of 
their literatures, then of their historic traditions, following the pat­
tern of national survival as it has developed time and again through­
out Europe. The old regime emphasized the Russian language and 
placed severe handicaps upon the development of the languages 
and cultures of the non-Russian peoples. 
In the ease of Poland, one of the most extreme cases, most 
of the secondary education, except for the Polish language and lit­
erature, had to be taught in Russian. So the Poles who had never 
heard Russian at home had to learn to write in schools and to write 
examinations and carry out class discussions in a foreign language. 
The University of Warsaw was almost completely Russian and was 
staffed by Russians. Ukrainian received no recognition at all. It 
was only after 1905 that little books of songs and poems could be 
published in Ukrainian. 
So there was a strong tendency to emphasize Russian, to 
insist upon assimilation to the Russian culture and outlook, as a 
basis for becoming a first-class citizen in the Russian empire. How­
ever, except in the case of the Poles and the Finns, these separate 
nationalities had not created any political problem for Russia prior 
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to 1914. Just because the repression was so severe, it was effective. 
If you are severe enough you can be effective but. it may lead to 
a terrific rebound. After 1917, however, the Russian Empire broke 
. up, and many separate states were formed. Estonia, Latvia, Fin­
. land and Lithuania became independent. Poland, of course, be­
came independent. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan all became 
independent and were independent for several years. The most 
numerous non-Russian people, the Ukrainians, also formed a sep­
arate regime and, for some months were able to assert a separate 
existence. Actually aside from the Poles and the Finns, with their 
strong traditions, national separatism arose out of the Communist 
revolution and was a reaction of these outlying peoples with dif­
ferent cultural and religious traditions against the Soviet regime. 
As long as they had expected a democratic revolution with freedom 
of all kinds, there had been no really mass movement for separa­
tion except among Finns and Poles. 
After the Soviet government had recognized in theory the 
right of every nationality to determine its own future, it turned 
around a:µd reconquered as many as it could of these nationalities 
which had formerly been in the Russian empire. Between 1918 
and 1925 it succeeded in conquering the Ukraine, half of Belo­
Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far Eastern Republic 
centered on Chita and Vladivostok. It was forced to acknowledge 
the separation of Poland, Finland and the Baltic States. In the 
case of the Baltic countries naval power was decisive in bringing 
power to bear to prevent Central Russia, seriously weakened at 
that time, from persisting in its efforts to reconquer the eastern 
shores of the Baltic. 
The nationality problem, then, and the national revolution, 
- the question of the future relations between the Russians and
the other peoples,-· was a potential rather than an immediate
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problem in 1914. It flared up prematurely, one might say, to an 
intense peak in 1917 because of the Communist revolution. It 
has become a much more difficult problem since that time. 
Finally, the religious problem was a very real part of the 
cultural problem in 1914. The Orthodox Church, as a state church, 
had been very closely connected with the Tsarist government. 
It did not have the high degree of independent loyalty which 
churches may develop under a separation of church and state. 
It had weaknesses within its own organization. There were dis­
reputable characters like Rasputin -who was not an official of 
the church, contrary to what the movies always show-who was 
able to exert a strong influence over the church administration 
and to build up a clique of his own to control it. There was a 
strong undercurrent of religious unrest in Russia. Russia had 
never gone through the Renaissance of 16th Century W1,stern 
Europe, had never gone through the Protestant or Catholic re­
formation with its great tightening of spiritual and moral dis­
cipline whch occured in Central or Western Europe. It was a 
body for the carrying out of ritual, in very large part. The role of 
the Russian church in teaching the people was slight. As late as 
1903 Pobedonostsev, the civilian head of the administration of 
the church, appointed by the Czar, sent out a circular, advising 
the priests not to preach because they were likely to make a great 
many mistakes, since they were not very well educated and were 
more likely to lead their flock into heresy than to enlighten them! 
So there was a kind of spiritual and moral unrest too, in 
Russia. The Russian intellectuals were asking themselves "the 
eternal questions", staying up all night to discuss them. What 
was their duty? Should they become revolutionaries? Should they 




Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 10, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss10/1
RESTRICTED 
In 1914, Russia did not have any plans for dominating the 
world, contrary to many theories that are now put about which 
maintain that Russia has always tried to spread over the entire 
world. In 1914 Russia was one of six great powers in Europe, 
one of four great powers in the Far Eastern balance of power, and 
it operated through
_ 
a system of alliances. In order to be strong 
it had a direct alliance with France and a potential one with Eng­
land. It operated as one power factor within a balance of power 
which sometimes operated as a concert of Europe. 
There was within Russian thought a Messianic strain, a 
feeling that Russia had a great message to bring to the world, 
but that was hardly ever carried into the field of practical politics 
in those days, as it is today. In fact the basic trend in Russia 
among the educated people was one of admiration for the West, 
of liking for its freedom and its development, and a strong desire 
to imitate it. Many of them perhaps had their eyes fixed so much 
on the West that they did not study the peculiarities of Russia 
closely enough and were not able to control the political forces 
which swept across it in 1917. 
Since 1917, and its establishment through a seizure of 
power, the Soviet regime .has gone through several great crises. 
The first· of these was the political and military struggle for sur­
vival in war and intervention. The intervention was a very half­
hearted affair. If carried out on a full-scale it could have been 
successful but the problems it would have created in the home­
lands of the intervening powers would have been very great too. 
In any case, the interests of England and France were more in 
weakening Russia, and the Soviet regime seemed likely to be a 
weak regime. Certainly it was very weak for the first fifteen 
years of its control. There was not really a strong determination, 
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except among individuals like Churchill, to overthrow the Soviet 
regime by outside intervention. 
Within the country, the Soviet leaders were skillful in 
either winning the support of · most of the workers and a large 
part of the peasantry or of neutralizing those who were not on 
their side, thus reducing the opposition to relatively small and 
divided groups. One of the techniques which they developed at 
that time, and have applied over and over ever since, is the tech­
nique of sharpening the conflict, of building up the extremes, 
trying to make sure that their extreme grows faster than the 
opposite extreme, trying to deny the capacity or right of any 
middle group to survive. This is a technique which they applied 
within Russia by saying that it was a choice between the Soviet 
regime or a return of police rule, landlord control of the peasants, 
control by the factory owners, in the old autocratic way. On that 
basis the Bolsheviks secured active support by a militant min­
ority and passive tolerance of their rule by a great majority of 
the people. 
At the same time of course, another technique which they 
used and have used over and over again is to promise those things 
which will bring immediate support even though they later reverse 
their pledges. In 1918 they were saying to the peasants, "We have 
given you the land. You have got the land, and the Soviet re­
gime is the only one that can guarantee that you will keep it." 
Then from 1929 to 1933 they took away the land again through 
collectivization. For them no political agreement is permanent, 
provided they can violate it to their own advantage and without 
risk of defeat. That was another technique which they developed 
very rapidly at that time and have used ever since. 
A second crisis came from 1929 to 1937 in the field of in­
dustrialization. The Soviet government embarked upon a very 
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wide-scale industrialization. I have no time to go into details of 
that but it meant more than doubling industrial population and 
increasing industrial output roughly three times over in a very 
short period of years. Along with this was the question of the 
control over the peasantry. During these same years of indus­
trialization, the government was engaged, from '29 to '33 in a 
bitter war against the peasantry in which the peasants were forc­
ed into the collective farm system. Over five million peasants 
were removed from their homes and sent into forced labor as 
"Kulaks". The name was applied i1;1 a very loose scale. Anyone 
who did not like collectivization could be put under that rubric 
and eliminated. This was a tremendous struggle. There were 
many thousands of casualties among the government as well as 
millions of casualties among their opponents, whether actual or 
potential. 
Finally after 1941 the Soviet government was involved in 
the greatest war in history, fighting on its own soil, using a 
large part of its industrial and agricultural areas, and suffering 
great hardship and great losses of manpower. In the latter stages 
of the war it recovered all its territory and expanded its control 
over a large number of its neighboring peoples. In every case, 
except that of Yugoslavia, it first secured military dominance in 
the area. Then it established political control through the local 
Communist parties and then through political and economic con­
trol, it has pulled its satellites closer and closer to the Soviet 
pattern. 
What are the factors which we have to watch in estimating 
Soviet strength and weakness? One factor is the complete cen­
tralization of control, exercised by a very small group at the top. 
This creates both strength and weakness. It has the strength 
to direct resources, skilled manpower, including administrators, 
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where it is most needed. I remember in 1943, during the period 
of the Moscow conference, I was complaining to one of the Soviet 
negotiators about the great slowness of replies to requests or 
proposals that had to be sent to Moscow, under the Soviet system 
of centralizing even minor decisions there. He said, "Mr. Molotov 
is busy building tanks all day until 11 :00 at night and he deals 
with foreign policy after 11 :00 at night. So that only a limited 
number of problems can be brought before him at any one time." 
This high degree of centralization means that they can bring pol­
icy and strength to bear rapidly and with complete absence of 
responsibility to anyone outside a small group. On the other hand, 
it means that they face difficulties of control down the line. People 
further down the line report those things which will make it safe 
for them in order to avoid punishment and keep safe. It is like the 
old story or three banks in a small town, which moved the cash 
reserve from one bank to another just in time for it to be counted 
by the inspector. Soviet administrators have to survive. To do 
that they often have to deceive their own leaders in spite of the 
great risk which that brings. Then there is the inefficiency of 
over-centralization, but I haven't time to go into that detail. 
The basic concept of Soviet control is found in the party 
line. At any given time there is a certain interpretation, a certain 
pressure toward a goal which is set from above. At a later time, 
that rriay shift to a somewhat different emphasis. It is only by a 
very careful study of slogans, editorials, speeches, that one can 
foreshadow the shifts which are about to occur or, in many cases, 
have already occured, only to be made public after being tried out 
in secret first. Every member of the administration is required 
to know the line. One of the things which has been striking 
in negotiating with the Russians is that something which happens, 
let us say in Indonesia, may affect something that is going on in 
Austria, where it is all closely tied in. A shift sometimes occurs 
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in a Soviet position by negotiating, and it isn't until afterwards 
that you can figure out that it is in response to something that has 
happened anywhere else in another theatre. We tend to decen­
tralize our problems and view each one on its merits. That is one 
of our difficulties in dealing with the Russians, because they are 
always trying fo deal with it as a whole. 
The "line" then is the ideological guide thrown out at any 
given time. There are three main channels thr<;mgh which the 
line is given at a time. One is through public statements, and 
those statements often follow -experiments with initiating a new 
line. The second .is through instructions given in party meetings 
by a system of party controls. Here the instructions are passed on 
to party members only at meetings. And the third channel is a 
system of circulating secret information and secret directives 
only to a top group which is estimated to run to about 3,000 people 
in Moscow and in the provinces. 
The Russians themselves have had many jokes about the 
party line and the way it frequently shifts, changing its emphasis 
from the left to the right foot, so to speak, The ability to be with 
the "line" and to change with it is very important in the survival 
of Soviet administrators and leaders of all ranks. 
The second factor of strength and weakness is in the forced 
industrialization which has been carried on throughout the 1930's 
and has been renewed with even greater ruthlessness since the 
war. (I haven't time to go into the det1:1.ils, Dr. Shimkin will want 
to take . that up). But I want to point out that this has created 
great strength. After all, the Soviet Union was able, in spite of the 
loss of so much of its industrial territory, to produce its own tanks, 
most of its own planes, and a large amount of its other equipment 
during the war. It has certainly hung on to that equipment as 
well as a great amount of captured equipment, and has gone on 
32 RESTRICTED 
35
Naval War College: December 1950 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
producing since the war on a considerable scale, although of course 
not in the same p:r-oportion as during the war, as far as we can 
judge. 
There are many bottlenecks in the Soviet industrial· system. 
It is like any wartime economy which is operating in full capacity, 
a shortage develops here in some specialized tool or some gauge, 
and production suffers. It requires great effort to assure a flow of 
raw materials, equipment and skilled manpower. The Soviet econ­
omy since 1928 has never had the sort of "gravy" which our 
economy has and which in 1939 to 1941 facilitated so greatly the 
transfer to wartime production. They are always operating right 
up to capacity. They have <many breakdowns and losses because 
of that. They have not even approached the smooth, continuous 
operation which we consider essential to efficient operation. 
Another factor is that this industrialization has been paid 
for right out of the blood and marrow of the people. The basic 
device by which it is paid for is the turn-over tax or sales tax. It 
seems incredible but the Russians pay a tax of !800% on bread, 
300% on eggs, 400% on sugar and corresponding sales taxes. Rough­
ly the industrial inve�tment of the government corresponds to the 
income from the sales tax plus income from sales under govern­
ment monoplies like salt, liquor, matches and tobacco. So the people 
themselves are paying higher prices due to these high taxes for 
industrialization. 
A third factor is that the main emphasis has been given 
to heavy industry, production of war material and machine tools. 
If you take a factor like steel for example, which rose from 6,000,-
000 metric tons in 1928 to 10,000,000 in 1932, 18,000,000 tons in 
1940, and it is expected to reach 25,000,000 tons in 1950 and you 
compare that with cotton textiles, basic to ·the livelihood of the 
people, the output of cotton goods planned for 1950 is the same as 
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that achieved in 1932. Meanwhile the area and population of the 
country have grown greatly. Civilian equipment was not replen­
ished at all during the war. Since .the war it has been replenished 
at a very low rate. In other words, the whole emphasis is on heavy 
industry and this leads to great strain. 
One of the main problems is the problem of discipline of 
labor. Labor is restless. The government has tried an kinds of 
devices. A worker who leaves his job without permission can be 
sentenced to three months in prison or six months work in his 
factory, paying 25% of his wages, small as they are, as a fine. A 
person who comes more than 20 minutes late for work three 
times over a period of time can be sentenced to continue to work 
at his job, deducting 25% from his wages. That sort of thing has 
not been tolerated for 100 years by American labor. Similar things 
occured in many countries at the very beginning of the industrial 
revolution. The problem of low standard of living in Russia which 
is the basic factor in labor unrest, cannot be solved as long as the 
government insists upon devoting primary effort to heavy industry 
and war material. 
The agricultural basis is weak. The collective farm system 
has achieved its political purpose. It has given the government 
control over the disposition of the crops, and it is effective in that 
way. It has led to some increase in the area of cultivation, much 
of it in sub-marginal land which should not have been brought 
under cultivation. It definitely has not raised the standard of 
living of the peasants. In fact, I believe it has lowered it some­
what, even compared with 1913. Soviet agriculture under its 
present system does not produce abundance of food and agricul­
tural raw materials. During the war, despite the large reserves 
which were believed to have been accumulated, the Soviet Union 
had to depend in large part, on lend-lease food in order to supply 
critical elements in the armed forces and industry. 
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The nationality problem is another strength and yet weak­
ness. The Soviet government has proclaimed the policy of devel-
. oping cultures which are "national in form and socialist in content", 
- in other words, "Soviet" in content. The word "socialist" should
not be given to the Soviet system, in my opinion, but should be
reserved for the democratic Socialism of the West.
This development of the nationalities has, however, under­
gone a number of important shifts. After a period in the 1920's 
when the emphasis was .on favoring the non-Russian nationalities 
and upon stimulating the development of their cultures, by .the mid-
1930's the shift came back to Russian culture. Emphasis was 
placed on Russian as a common language of the whole country, 
as well as of the armed forces, and as the language of the "leading" 
nationality within the Soviet state. In 1945, two weeks after V-E 
Day, Stalin made a speciaf toast, saying, "I want to drink to the 
Russian people",-:-- and he emphasized the word "Russian," "which 
has borne the main burden of the war." 
There has been a very sharp shift back toward emphasis 
on the primacy of Russian culture and language. For instance 
in Georgia or Azerbaijan, a worker can become a foreman in a 
factory, studying in his own language, Georgian or Azerbaijanian 
Turkish. But if he wants to become an engineer, he must learn 
Russian and must learn it well, in order to be able to absorb the 
education and in order to compete with Russian-speaking fellow­
students for a chance at advanced training. 
At the end of the war there were large groups of non­
Russian Soviet people who refused to return to the Soviet Union. 
Many of them were returned by force. Among these groups were 
many Ukrainians, as well as people of other non-Russian groups. 
There were other peoples, of course, not to mention the intelligent­
sia of the Baltic States, which was quite unreconciled to being 
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under Soviet rule. It is clear that the Soviet promotion of the 
national languages and cultures, even under the sever:e limitation 
of conformity to Soviet ideas, has started a long train of evolution 
which may extend way beyond our times. Whether it will result 
in the development of a genuine federation of nationalities or 
whether the repulsion of the separate nationalities against Soviet 
rule will lead them at a critical moment to break away from Russia 
is a question which will require very careful study. 
The Soviet Union develops cultural isolation and cultural 
autarchy as a means of emphasizing the deep separation of the 
Soviet from the non-Soviet world. This has certain weaknesses 
too. In the technical field they are very active, as we know, to our 
very great disadvantage, in securing every kind of information. 
In this country they are free to buy copies of every patent and 
copies of every technical magazine, while Soviet periodicals of 
the same type are now forbidden to be exported. 
In the few remaining minutes I have only one or two more 
matters which I can call to your attention. One of these is the ques­
tion whether the Soviet revolution was a ;Russian revolution or_ 
a world-wide revolution? The revolution came about in Russia 
because of many peculiar conditions, not duplicated exactly any­
where else, either in Europe or in Asia. There are many writers 
on the Soviet revolution who maintain that it was a "Russian" 
revolution. However, the Soviet leaders have always insisted that 
it was the beginning of a world-wide revolution. As soon as they 
were able they established a Communist international. When 
that was abolished in 1943, they had available considerable cadres 
of trained Communists, many of them with experience in Soviet 
administration, including both the intelligence and secret police 
systems and were able to operate through them and without the out­
ward form of a universal or world-wide communist organization. 
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Even in 1928 when Stalin was hopeful of getting loans 
abroad and trying in every way to get foreign help, he stressed 
that the purpose of industrialization was to strengthen the Soviet 
Union so that it could fulfill its duty to assisting the triumph of 
Communism throughout the world. 
The Soviet leaders assume that conflict between the Soviet 
and non-Soviet worlds is inevitable and continuous. But whether 
this conflict will take the form of a war-to-the death is left open. 
The Soviet leaders maneuver so that they can push hard in some 
sectors and play it soft in others, whereas we are inclined to be 
soft all over or hard all over. They do this in part, so that it 
cannot be said at any given time that they want to have an all-out 
conflict. We need to learn that. Apparently we have been either 
too soft with them, as I felt was the case during the war, or we 
are hard all along the line. Perhaps it would be more confusing 
to an antagonist if we would vary our own tactics more. 
Another factor which is very important in a revolutionary 
technique is the combination of military and political factors, 
using one and then the other, and using military predominance 
to get control of political power by skillful use of each. 
In the Soviet view of the world, the whole question of 
"getting along", of sitting down together, is quite irrelevant. 
Conflict is basic to life. They take a strictly material point of view 
and apply it to social and political life. They do not believe one 
can put conflict out of the way by simply agreeing to do so. And 
when people in our country say we should sit down and have a 
general settlement, or when Mr. Churchill, to my amazement, says 
we should "sit down" with Stalin and just settle things, they are 
unrealistic. Actually, because the Soviet leaders· believe that con­
flict is inevitable, they are very much disappointed when some­
thing is given to them without having to struggle for it. I thought 
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after Yalta that the Russians were disappointed that the Far 
Eastern concessions were given to them without argument and 
without struggle. They must have gone away with the feeling 
that they might have gotten even more, and they probably blamed 
themselves for not having asked for even more. The psychology 
of making even a friendly concession in the expectation that good­
will will be created doesn't work out with them. I do riot know 
any time in our dealings with the Soviet Union when it has worked 
out. 
We must learn to deal with the Soviet leadership on its own 
terms of reference, accepting, for practical purposes, the idea 
that conflict with our world is inherent in the whole nature of 
things. We have to conduct our part of that conflict in a much 
more effective and coordinated way than we have done. At any 
given time, it does not mean that the Soviet government has deter­
mined that war is inevitable. They have written a good deal since 
the war about "socialist encirclement" of capitalism, rather than 
"capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet State. The Soviet leaders 
will try to go on to encircle the democratic world, which they pref er 
to call the capitalist world. Our problem is to cope with that prob­
ably rather than a direct frontal attack. 
In their reasoning about the nature of the conflict, th,� 
Soviet leaders differ in at least one respect from Hitler. Hitler 
felt time was working against him; that if he did not establish 
control of Europe within a lmited time, it would be too late. The 
growth of Russia, the continued strength of the British Common­
wealth, and so on, would make his aim impossible of achievement 
at a later time. Hitler had a rather tight time-schedule. I believe 
the Soviet leaders accept war as a distinct possibility, perhaps 
in the long run, a certainty. They would not hesistate to use it 
if they thought it would be effective in securing their aims. On 
the other hand I think they do not, from their own philosophy, feel 
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the immediate urge to use it within a limited time. From their 
point of view, the forces of dissolution of capitalism, especially in 
the colonial world, would be more effective than an early war in 
spreading the Soviet system, and, if given more time would per­
haps work out to the Soviet goal without the losses and risks of a 
major war. 
At any given time Soviet policy is based upon maximum 
and minimum aims. Those aims have to be watched whether we 
are looking at Asia, Europe, the Middle East or Africa. 
That brings us to the three ways of trying to deal with 
Russia. Should we try to defeat Russia outright in the hope that 
that would simplify our problems? I think that fighting people 
generally feel that even a short war of that kind is much more 
costly in social, political and material ways than a long period of 
preparation for war in the hope of avoiding it, but of course I 
can't speak for that. 
The second way is by appeasement. I have altilady said that, 
from my own experience of spending some 2,000 hours negotiating 
with the Russians, as well as observing and discussing other nego­
tiations, it is sometimes possible to work out individual adjust­
ments here and there, but not to settle any of the major problems 
permanently. They always reappear because in the Soviet view 
each problem represents a contest for power. It goes on. Even 
though one side may wish it would not go on, it cannot be wished 
out of existence. 
The other is the policy of containment. I believe that con­
tainment, intelligently and effectively applied, is our only hope. 
I am very glad that we are beginning to raise our military power, 
-our armed power in the broad sense, -to something approach­
ing the level of the political commitments that we have undertaken
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since the war. I believe that containment alone is not enough, 
that there are elements of weakness within the Soviet regime or 
Soviet orbit which we should play upon to the maximum, by skill­
ful psychological warfare, which, however, must be backed by a 
really well-thought-out political party. 
It is possible that the Soviet regime will settle down and 
become more "livable with." We must remember that the Soviet 
regime is not very "livable with," even for the Soviet people. Dur­
ing the war, Soviet citizens tol.d me quite frequently that they 
hoped things would be better after the war, that there would be 
a material improvement because of greater emphasis upon raising 
the standard of living rather than keeping it at a bare minimum 
for most of the people, so that there would be somewhat greater 
freedom for the individual even within an over-all political dicta­
torship. Even under an absolutism it is possible to have some 
freedom of discussion. It is not necessary to have a single official 
line in everything, including linguistics, (you may have noticed 
that Marshall Stalin has recently laid down the line even _in lin­
guistics, in which he is surely not an expert). 
Now as one Soviet official of fairly high rank, and speaking 
in Russian and in confidence, said to me toward the end of the war, 
or rather before the shift which came in November 1944 toward a 
stiffened Soviet line towards the West, "Before the war the regime 
did not trust the people; now the people have saved the regime and 
the regime has got to trust the people." These hopes were shattered 
by the new tightening up which began in late 1944 and has contin­
ued since the war. Briefly, there was a reversion to emphasis upon 
dictatorship of the party in place of the wartime appeal to broadly 
patriotic and national sentiments. In foreign policy that shift was 
paralleled by the stiffening of the line, the gradual placing of the 
United States in the place formerly occupied by Hitler in the 
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Soviet concept, and by the renewed drive to capture all our "good" 
slogans of "Freedom - Democracy - Opportunity" and to claim 
those as Soviet monopolies. 
The Soviet regime can, presumably become a "livable" · re­
gime. The rank-and-file of its officials live under a great strain, 
and a mis-step may lead to elimination and destruction of them­
selves and their families. If there should be a settling down in the 
Soviet regime, it would come through establishing clear lines of 
authority, so that an official, whether civilian or :military, will 
know whether he is wrong or not, and what he is supposed to do. 
At present, he may be punished for something he did not do or 
punished for something that he thought he was not supposed to 
do, a very complicated system to live under. A process of settling 
down might lead from that to a system of defining a clearer 
status for the different groups of people. It would lead to a better 
standard of living, a lessened emphasis on capital goods industries 
and military industries. 
I emphasize that at present I See no signs of such an evolu­
tion in the Soviet regime. I merely mention these possible lines 
of development which we should be alert to detect. If signs of an 
internal "settling down" should begin to appear, as a result of 
the postponement to an indefinite future of the desire to conquer 
Western Europe and to conquer the rest of Asia, it would be the 
most helpful sign in a long time of the Soviet leadership accepting 
limitations on their role and on their power. Such an evolution 
would make other peoples feel that the Soviet leaders were begin­
ning to practice what they preach when they assert that different 
systems can co-exist in the same world. 
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By Karl Scholz. New Republic. November 13. 
"Uniting for Peace." 
By John Foster Dulles. The Department of State Bulletin. 
October 23. 
"Sino-Soviet Relations in Retrospect." 
By N. Wing Mah. The Russian Review. October. 
"Why Are the Western Germans Reluctant to Rearm?". 
By Alain Clement. Reporter. November 7. 
"Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy." 
By R. S. Tarn. International Journal. Autumn, 1950. 
"We Can Win the Cold War-in Russia." 
By C. W. Boldyreff. Reader's Digest for November. 
"Bal(J,nced Forces and Western Defence." 
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Quarterly for October. 
"The Russidn Horizon." 
By David Cort. United Nations World for November. 
"Reviewing American Foreign Policy Since 1945." 
By Senator Tom Connally. The Department of State Bulletin. 
October 9. 
"Military and Economic Strength of Western Europe." 
By Vera M. Dean, and Howard C. Gary. Foreign Policy 
Reports. October 15. 
"China." 
By John K. Fairbank. Atlantic. November. 
"Air Power and the Heartland." 
By Lt. Col. Harry A. Sachaklian, USAF. Air University 
Quarterly Review. Summer Issue. 
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